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ABSTRACT 
In this Article, we show how our society can use corporate 
governance shifts to address, if not entirely resolve, a number of currently 
pressing social and economic problems. These problems include: rising 
income inequality; demographic disparities in wealth and equity 
ownership; increasing poverty and income insecurity; a need for greater 
innovation and investment in solving problems like disease and climate 
change; the “externalization” of many costs of corporate activity onto third 
parties such as customers, employees, creditors, and the broader society; 
the corrosive influence of corporate money in politics; and discontent and 
loss of trust in the capitalist system among a large and growing segment 
of the population. 
We demonstrate how, to a very significant extent, these problems can 
be traced to the way shares in business corporations are currently owned, 
traded, and voted. We also offer a plausible plan for shifting the structure 
of share ownership, trading, and voting to create a more democratic and 
sustainable capitalism that allows business corporations to better serve 
humanity. Our proposal, which envisions developing a new form of 
institutional shareholder, does not rely either on market forces or 
government interventions. Rather, it relies on voluntary cooperation and 
the private ordering of free individuals using modern information 
                                                     
 Distinguished Professor of Corporate and Business Law and Director of the Clarke Program on 
Corporations and Society, Cornell Law School. 
 Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Director, Clarke Program on Corporations and 
Society, Cornell Law School... The authors would like to thank Tamara Belinfanti, Frank Partnoy, 
Saule Omarova, Odette Lienau, Jeff Rachlinski, Jesse Fried, Sidney Tarrow, Aziz Rana, Bradley 
Wendel, Daniel Greenwood, Jennifer Hill, Andrea Tina, Lynne Taylor, Shelley Griffiths, Struan Scott, 
Ursula Cheer, and David Ciepley for their comments and suggestions, along with participants at 
workshops on and presentations of this paper given at Cornell Law School, the Berle Conference held 
at Georgia State University, the University of Otago in Dunedin, the University of Canterbury in 
Christchurch, the University of Milan, and Victoria University of Wellington. 
552 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:551 
technologies. It operates to reduce inequalities not only in wealth and 
income but also in influence over business corporations. 
INTRODUCTION 
Change begins with imagining something better. In this Article, we 
imagine a future where our society has ameliorated, if not resolved, a 
number of currently pressing social and economic problems. These 
problems include: rising socioeconomic inequality; racial and generational 
disparities in participation in equity markets; increasing poverty and 
income insecurity; inadequate innovation and investment in solving 
problems like disease and climate change; the “externalization” of many 
costs of corporate activity, such as carbon emissions, systemic risk, and 
the degradation of human health, onto third parties (customers, employees, 
creditors, the broader society); the corrosive influence of corporate money 
in politics; and the disengagement and alienation of large and growing 
segments of the population, leading to loss of trust in the capitalist system 
and the possibility of civic unrest. 
The insight underlying our approach is that governments are not the 
only institutions that can solve collective social and economic problems. 
Another type of powerful institution—the business corporation—can be 
brought to bear. Many of today’s corporations rival nation-states in 
weight, influence, and reach. Collectively, they control tens of trillions of 
dollars in assets and affect hundreds of millions of customers, employees, 
and shareholders. Indeed, the corporate sector can be analogized to a kind 
of parallel state or shadow government that touches all our lives on a daily 
basis. The corporate sector can provide enormous benefits: investment 
returns, employment opportunities, innovative products, and tax revenues. 
It can also inflict great harms: environmental damage, consumer frauds, 
political corruption, and employee deaths and injuries. 
We all have a stake in how our business corporations are governed. 
Yet many laypersons think of corporations as an irresistible force that 
helps or harms, but remains outside average citizens’ control.1 As experts 
in corporate governance, we recognize this state of affairs need not be 
inevitable. Many of our current economic and social problems can be 
traced to the way shares in business corporations are currently owned, 
traded, and voted. In particular, the economic benefits of equity ownership 
are highly concentrated today among older, whiter, and wealthier 
                                                     
 1. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once famously described the corporation as a 
“Frankenstein monster.” Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933). 
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investors.2 Shareholder influence over corporations is even more 
concentrated. Recognizing that their individual votes are unlikely to 
matter, many individual shareholders who own stocks directly do not vote 
their shares at all.3 Others who invest through institutions like mutual or 
pension funds leave the job of share voting to a handful of professional 
fund managers who, in turn, typically expect to keep the shares of any 
particular company for two years or less.4 The result is a public company 
sector where firms are driven to focus far more on boosting short-term 
share price than on pursuing long-term, sustainable, and socially beneficial 
corporate strategies.5 
This Article outlines a plausible plan for shifting the structure of 
share ownership, trading, and voting to create a more democratic, 
sustainable, and responsible capitalism. It envisions the creation of a new 
type of institutional shareholder we dub the Universal Fund (Fund) and the 
broad distribution of ownership of shares in that Fund so that all citizens—
including young people, people of color, and less wealthy people—reap 
the economic benefits of the corporations that are the engines of our 
economy. Additionally, the plan would ensure that citizens who receive 
shares in the new fund have incentive to focus on long-term corporate 
                                                     
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 36–37. In recent years, equity ownership has become even 
more unequal. See Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Stock Ownership Down Among All but Older, Higher-
Income, GALLUP (May 24, 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/211052/stock-ownership-down-
among-older-higher-income.aspx (explaining that the U.S. stock ownership rate is declining among 
all Americans except upper-income, older ones; in 2008, sixty-two percent of U.S. adults owned stock, 
whereas in 2017, only fifty-four percent did). 
 3. So many shareholders are reluctant to vote that, in order to make a quorum, corporations often 
must hire third party proxy solicitation services to contact shareholders and try to persuade them to 
vote. See, e.g., Our History, GEORGESON, http://www.georgeson.com/us/about-us/our-history 
[https://perma.cc/XXF8-C7JV]. 
 4. See INV. CO. INST., MUTUAL FUNDS AND PORTFOLIO TURNOVER 2 (Nov. 17, 2004), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/rc_v1n2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK6V-9LAR ] (stating that in 2004, there was 
an average 117% portfolio turnover rate for mutual funds, implying an average holding period of less 
than a year); Alon Brav et. al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1732 (2008) (explaining that the turnover rate suggests 20-month holding periods for 
hedge funds in the sample); see also LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 66 (2012) (stating that 
in 2010, average turnover for equities listed on U.S. exchanges was 300%, implying a four-month 
average holding period). 
 5. See THE ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR 
A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (2009), 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pd
f [https://perma.cc/W5ZT-9K2L]; THE CONFERENCE BD., IS SHORT-TERM BEHAVIOR JEOPARDIZING 
THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF BUSINESS? (2015), www.wlrk.com/docs/IsShortTermBehavior 
JeopardizingTheFutureProsperityOfBusiness_CEOStrategicImplications.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
W4FD-J2YP]; J.W. MASON, UNDERSTANDING SHORT-TERMISM: QUESTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
(2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Understanding-Short-Termism.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8VE-TYGF].  
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sustainability and social and environmental impacts, rather than short-term 
share prices. Also, it would make it far easier for them to exercise an 
effective voice in corporate governance. 
Democratic processes are important to ensuring governments serve 
their citizens. We show how similar benefits can be enjoyed by promoting 
more democracy in business corporations. Conversely, policy discussions 
that ignore or misunderstand the complex web of individuals, institutions, 
and rules that currently govern our corporate sector, at best, overlook a 
critical component of reform, and at worst, produce plans and proposals 
that are harmful.6 Corporations can generate not only private gains but 
public good. Indeed, engaging the full power of our business sector may 
be essential to meet many of our greatest challenges. It is not enough to 
have a democratic political system. We also need democratic capitalism. 
This Article suggests how to build it. 
It is important to note our proposal does not rely either on market 
forces or government interventions. Rather, it relies on the voluntary 
cooperation and private ordering of free individuals using modern 
information technologies. Moreover, while our plan is utopian, it is also 
achievable. Even if initially adopted only on a small scale, it is designed 
to grow in size and effect over time. The primary obstacles to our plan’s 
implementation are psychological, especially the often-unspoken beliefs 
that large problems cannot be solved through voluntary coordination; that 
humans are always and only selfish; and that anything that has not been 
done in the past cannot succeed in the future. Through the exercise of 
imagination, these obstacles can be overcome. 
I. A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF THE PROPOSAL 
Perhaps the best way to set the stage for exploring the strengths and 
weaknesses of our proposal is to first present its basic features. Space 
constraints necessarily prevent us from presenting a detailed discussion, 
which we are developing in other work.7 Here, we offer a basic outline to 
provide the basis for exploring some of our plan’s more important 
implications and challenges. 
                                                     
 6. For example, in 1993, Congress amended the tax code to require public companies to tie their 
top executives’ pay to objective performance metrics to ensure full tax deductibility—a rule change 
that encouraged widespread use of stock-based compensation schemes that, in turn, encouraged 
pathological corporate behaviors, including excessive risk-taking and fraud. Lynn A. Stout, Killing 
Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of “Pay for Performance,” 39 J. CORP. L. 
526, 533–35 (2014). 
 7. With coauthor Tamara Belinfanti, we are preparing a book for Berrett-Koehler Publishers that 
expands upon this Article. LYNN A. STOUT ET AL., CITIZEN CAPITALISM: HOW A UNIVERSAL FUND 
CAN PROVIDE INCOME AND INFLUENCE TO ALL (forthcoming 2019) (on file with authors). 
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We have dubbed our proposal the Blueprint for Citizen Capitalism 
(Blueprint). Blueprint has five basic elements. First, upon reaching the age 
of eighteen years, all U.S. citizens8 would receive a share in a collective 
portfolio of securities—in effect, a share in a collective mutual fund, the 
Fund. As in a typical mutual fund, the Fund’s shareholders would 
periodically receive a proportionate share of all dividends and interest 
payments paid to the Universal Fund Portfolio (Portfolio).9 Ideally, under 
our Blueprint, the Portfolio would include equity securities from a wide 
variety of corporations, both public and private. With this structure in 
mind, we call the Fund’s shareholders Universal Shareholders 
(Shareholders).10 
Second, at least initially,11 the Fund would acquire the securities in 
its Portfolio primarily from shares donated by high-net worth individuals 
and companies, for example, during public offerings.12 We explore these 
and other funding options in greater detail later but note here such 
                                                     
 8. Although for purposes of discussion, we propose distributing shares to U.S. citizens older than 
seventeen years. It is of course possible to adopt other selection criteria (e.g., citizens of all ages, all 
legal residents, citizens of another nation or the European Union, and so forth). 
 9. Our proposal embraces the spirit of the many Universal Basic Income (UBI) proposals that 
have been offered over the years. Such proposals date back at least to Thomas Paine’s 1797 proposal 
for a citizen’s dividend. See THOMAS PAINE, AGRARIAN JUSTICE (1797) (proposing that all citizens 
receive a “citizens dividend” as compensation for the “loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the 
introduction of the system of landed property”). This idea has since attracted advocates ranging from 
Milton Friedman to tech billionaires like Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg. See Sebastian Johnson, 
The Case for a Universal Basic Income, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/ 
op-ed/la-oe-johnson-universal-basic-income-20170629-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZZV4-W9TU]. 
Blueprint also echoes proposals to redistribute wealth like Anne Alstott’s and Bruce Ackerman’s 
proposal for “The Stakeholder Society,” outlined in their 1999 book. ANNE ALSTOTT & BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999) (proposing that all U.S. citizens receive a onetime 
payment of $80,000 upon reaching the age of 21). Similarly, Robert Hockett has proposed to 
redistribute all resources so that citizens are in positions of equality in an “efficient equal-opportunity 
republic.” See Robert C. Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, 
Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership 
Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 48 (2005). 
 10. Our concept of the Universal Shareholder should not be confused with the “universal 
investor” or “universal owner” label sometimes applied to large institutional investors like pension 
and mutual funds, which are so broadly diversified that they are more concerned with the performance 
of the economy as a whole than with the performance of a single company. See generally JAMES P. 
HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC (2000). 
 11. After some period of time and to a growing extent, Shareholders’ interest in the Fund would 
also increase in value as the shares of deceased Shareholders revert to the Fund upon death. 
 12. The Fund would also hold shares of nonpublic companies to the extent these shares were 
contributed by either the companies themselves or by their shareholders. Leaving shares to the Fund 
might be an attractive option for founders of private companies who want to leave a legacy or increase 
the chances their companies remain in operation after their deaths. 
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donations are quite likely.13 Many corporations are interested in being 
perceived as “good citizens,” as evidenced by corporate philanthropy and 
the growing interest in so-called benefit corporations.14 Other corporations 
might view the Universal Fund as a desirable long-term shareholder.15 
Similarly, many high net worth individuals have a keen interest in 
philanthropy, as demonstrated by the Giving Pledge recently organized by 
Bill Gates and Warren Buffett. By 2016, the Giving Pledge had attracted 
154 signatories from sixteen countries, each of whom had pledged to give 
away at least half of their wealth.16 
Third, the Administrators of the Universal Fund would not be entitled 
to any portion of the profits generated by the Fund—they would not be 
residual claimants. Rather, they would be passive functionaries 
compensated only by a fixed fee that (unlike fees in the typical mutual 
fund) would not be based on the Fund’s performance or assets under 
management.17 This administrative fee should be quite low because, unlike 
the managers of most mutual funds today, the Administrators would not 
be allowed to trade securities in an effort to reap trading profits.18 
Securities would exit the Portfolio only through transactions controlled by 
third parties (e.g., through an agreement of merger or the maturation of a 
                                                     
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 76–80. 
 14. See Suntae Kim et al., Why Companies Are Becoming B Corporations, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(June 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/why-companies-are-becoming-b-corporations [https://perma. 
cc/XUG5-PNQ9]; see also CR’s 100 Best Corporate Citizens 2017, CORP. RESP. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 
2017, http://www.thecro.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CR_100Bestpages_digitalR.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5HNW-MZ74]; Giving USA 2017 Infographic, GIVING USA, https://givingusa.org/see-the-
numbers-giving-usa-2017-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/3KCF-5G8J] (noting that giving from 
corporations amounted to $18.55 billion in 2016). Corporate philanthropy can also attract substantial 
positive attention.  
 15. To the extent that corporate directors and managers feel pressure to abandon desirable 
strategies in order to placate short term shareholders, see supra note 5, they might prefer to have a 
significant block of shares held by the Fund, an intrinsically long-term investor whose Administrators 
and Shareholders cannot buy or sell. See infra text accompanying notes 50–58. 
 16. Laura Lorenzetti, 17 More Billionaires Join Buffett and Gates’ Giving Pledge this Year, 
FORTUNE (June 1, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/01/giving-pledge-new-members-2016/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TU7P-VT8R]. 
 17. If Administrators were compensated according to the size or performance of the Fund, this 
would create a perverse incentive for the Administrators to try to inflate the Portfolio’s reported market 
value, e.g., by withholding or making it difficult for Shareholders to receive dividends. It could also 
result in Administrators being rewarded or punished for market shifts beyond their control. 
 18. Administrative fees for the Fund will resemble fees paid to “passively managed” or “index” 
funds, which generally are extremely low. For example, where the average actively managed stock 
fund charges expenses of 1.34% of assets managed annually, Vanguard and Schwab offer “ETF” 
equity funds that charge annual fees of only 0.05–0.03%. Heather Long, The Best Cheap Investment 
Funds, CNN MONEY (June 6, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/06/investing/invest-in-funds-
with-low-fees/index.html [https://perma.cc/WJK4-DKXW]. 
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bond).19 The Administrators’ job would be just that—passive 
administration, including maintaining a list of Shareholders, distributing 
dividends, and so forth. 
Fourth, Shareholders in the Fund would not be allowed to sell, 
hypothecate, or bequeath their shares.20 Shares would be held throughout 
the Shareholders’ lives, and upon their deaths, their interests in the Fund 
would revert to the Fund itself (thus, marginally increasing the value of all 
other Shareholders’ interests, just as the issuance of new shares to new 
Shareholders would marginally dilute all other Shareholders’ interests). 
The sole economic benefit enjoyed by Shareholders by virtue of their 
interest in the Fund would be a proportionate interest in the dividends and 
interest the Fund received from its portfolio securities. This economic 
interest makes Shareholders, of necessity, long-term shareholders.21 
Rational Shareholders would anticipate that as long as the companies 
whose shares and bonds were held by the Fund pay dividends and interest, 
they will receive a stream of income. This income stream would not be 
guaranteed. Rather, it would be determined by the performance and 
distribution policies of the underlying corporations whose securities were 
held in the Portfolio. 
Finally, unlike either the typical mutual fund, or the typical wealth 
redistribution or basic income proposal,22 under Blueprint Shareholders 
would receive not only a proportionate economic right to dividends and 
interest paid into the Portfolio but also a proportionate political right to 
direct how Administrators vote the equity securities held in the Portfolio 
in the annual and special shareholders’ meetings.23 The governance of 
                                                     
 19. The cash generated from such transactions could be used by the Administrators to purchase 
additional equity securities according to some automatic rule, such as “buy more stocks in the same 
proportions as those already found in the Portfolio or “buy the stocks in the S&P index.” 
 20. Universal Fund Share ownership would thus become an “inalienable right.” See generally 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Restrictions on Shareholders’ sale, 
bequeathing, or hypothecation of shares could be enforced by making such transactions legally invalid. 
Cf. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market 
for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 713–21 (1999) (discussing common law rule making 
derivative contracts legally unenforceable). 
 21. Although Shareholders nearing the end of their life expectancy may be more short-term 
oriented (for example, preferring that companies adopt overly generous dividend policies), their 
interests will be counterbalanced by younger Shareholders who prefer that corporations invest 
optimally for future returns. This dynamic is different from the incentives of today’s shareholders, 
who typically hold shares for two years or less. See supra note 4. 
 22. See supra note 9. 
 23. Today, mutual funds generally do not offer their investors the option of directing how the 
shares in the fund portfolio should be voted, likely because it is not rational for such investors to want 
to vote. See infra note 86 (discussing “rational apathy”).  
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companies in the Portfolio is a common good, and the transaction costs 
associated with becoming informed and issuing instructions would deter 
most Shareholders from giving voting instructions directly as individuals. 
However, Shareholders could delegate their voting rights to shareholder 
“proxy service” firms, similar to those that exist today to develop voting 
guidelines and cast delegated votes for institutional investors (e.g., Glass 
Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)).24 Blueprint would 
create incentives to develop proxy services that cater to the long-term, 
diversified interests of Shareholders because it would mandate that the 
cost of these firms’ services (typically quite small)25 be borne by the Fund 
rather than by individual Shareholders. Such an arrangement would 
promote the development of new proxy services that compete for 
Shareholders’ patronage on the basis of the quality of voting guidelines 
and services, rather than low cost.26 Thus, unlike retail investors today, 
Shareholders could end up exercising significant collective influence over 
how the companies held in the Portfolio are governed. 
This brief Introduction, laying out the bare bones of our proposal, has 
likely raised questions in the minds of many readers. We hope to answer 
many of them in Parts I and II (below), which offer a more detailed 
discussion of how Blueprint can address a range of social concerns and 
discuss possible critiques and challenges. Due to space constraints and the 
inevitable uncertainty associated with designing complex new institutions, 
it is not possible in these pages to describe every possible element of the 
Fund and the accompanying new shareholder proxy services envisioned 
by Blueprint. Nor can we provide definitive answers here to every possible 
policy choice or question Blueprint poses. We hope simply to persuade 
most readers that such details are worthy of being debated and determined 
in future work and to offer a promising new direction for using voluntary 
private ordering and corporate governance to address, if not entirely 
                                                     
 24. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-47, CORPORATE 
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681050.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
738C-AT5Q]; Lynn A. Stout, Guest Column, Why Should ISS Be the New Master of the Corporate 
Governance Universe?, DOW JONES CORP. GOVERNANCE, Jan. 4, 2006. 
 25. Although mutual funds do not break out the fees—they pay proxy services in their SEC 
filings—necessarily, the fees must be significantly less than the total annual administrative expenses 
incurred by index funds, which can be as little as 0.03–0.05% of assets. See supra note 18. 
 26. Mutual funds feel pressured by federal regulations to use proxy services but remain rationally 
indifferent to the quality of their voting guidelines. They therefore prefer to select a proxy service that 
has the lowest possible cost and that other funds use (thus, providing regulatory “cover”). Moreover, 
to the extent that actively managed mutual funds use proxy services, their relatively short holding 
drives them to prefer proxy service guidelines that emphasize short-term share price performance. See 
generally Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case 
for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384 (2009); Stout, supra note 24. 
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resolve, social and economic problems that have proven resistant to market 
forces and government regulation. 
II. PROBLEMS ADDRESSED 
To understand the potential power of Blueprint, it is useful to begin 
by recognizing the wide range of social and economic problems it can help 
address. These problems include—but importantly, are not limited to—the 
inequality and income insecurity that typical wealth redistribution and 
basic income proposals focus on. Thus, we briefly describe below seven 
economic and social phenomena that are widely recognized today in the 
United States as problems in need of a remedy. They are: rising inequality, 
a persistent racial divide in wealth and equity ownership, increasing 
poverty and income insecurity, a need for more innovation and investment 
in the future, the externalization of many costs of corporate activity, the 
corrupting influence of corporate money in politics, and rising civic 
discontent and related “soft” social ills. 
A. Rising Inequality 
There is considerable debate today over wealth and income 
inequality, which appears to be increasing in the United States. For 
example, the share of wealth held by the top 0.1% of wealth holders 
increased from seven percent in 1978 to twenty-two percent by 2012.27 
Many informed observers believe inequality is likely to worsen in 
the future. Thomas Piketty has famously argued in his best-selling book, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, that returns to capital now exceed 
economic growth rates and further suggested reasons why asset holders’ 
incomes may exceed wage earners’ even more in the future.28 He has 
estimated that the top ten percent of income earners saw their share of 
national income increase from thirty to thirty-five percent to forty-five to 
fifty percent between the 1970s and the 2000s, and if this trend continues, 
the top decile will capture sixty percent by 2030.29 Commentators have 
identified other trends likely to worsen inequality, including: the 
                                                     
 27. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: 
Evidence From Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 520 (2016). Inequality is also 
endemic at the global level; the net worth of the eight richest individuals, six of whom are American, 
now equals the wealth of the bottom half of the remaining human population. OXFAM INT’L, AN 
ECONOMY FOR THE 99%: IT’S TIME TO BUILD A HUMAN ECONOMY THAT BENEFITS EVERYONE, NOT 
JUST THE PRIVILEGED FEW 2, 10 (2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_ 
attachments/bp-economy-for-99-percent-160117-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2GX-DMZA]. 
 28. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 22–27, 220–22, 350–60 
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., President & Fellows Harv. Coll. 2014). 
 29. Id. at 294. 
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elimination of many jobs through automation,30 the increasing 
concentration of stock ownership in public companies,31 the recent pattern 
of public companies disappearing to be replaced by private companies,32 
and the creation of massive fortunes that allow the ultra-wealthy to acquire 
still more wealth through corruption and political rent-seeking.33 
Blueprint works to temper inequality by redistributing ownership of 
equity more equally; thus, providing additional ongoing income that 
contributes relatively more to the incomes of lower earners.34 Although 
considerable inequality would persist (as is true under most wealth 
redistribution and basic income proposals), Blueprint has one additional 
and highly significant advantage over other proposals. That advantage is: 
Blueprint does not require government intervention or coercive taxation, 
whether of wealth, incomes, or robots that replace human workers.35 
Rather, Blueprint tempers inequality through the voluntary actions of 
individuals and corporations, and eventually, the return of shares to the 
Fund upon the deaths of individual Shareholders. 
B. Demographic Differences in Equity Ownership 
Wealth and income are not only distributed unequally today; this 
inequality follows racial and generational patterns, especially in equity 
ownership. For example, in 2011, the median financial wealth (checking 
and retirement accounts) of African–Americans was only $200, while that 
                                                     
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 37 and 41. 
 31. See GALLUP, supra note 2 (stating that stock ownership declined from sixty-two percent to 
fifty-four percent from financial crisis). 
 32. See GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE 
HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY 15–17 (2016) (stating that domestic companies listed on U.S. 
exchanges declined from more than 8000 in 1996 to just over 4000 in 2012); Bob Bryan, There Are 
Nowhere Near as Many Public Companies in the U.S. as There Should Be, BUS. INSIDER (July 5, 2015 
8:27 AM), www.businessinsider.com/us-has-too-few-publicly-listed-companies-2015-6 [https:// 
perma.cc/2KD4-44BB] (citing a study concluding that U.S. listings were declining while listings 
elsewhere were increasing, and that more than half of the “listing gap” was attributable to new 
companies declining to list). 
 33. See Moses Naim, The Problem with Piketty’s Inequality Formula, ATLANTIC (May 27, 
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/05/the-problem-with-pikettys-
inequality-formula/371653/ [https://perma.cc/23PN-CHTL]. 
 34. When wealthy individuals and less wealthy individuals receive equal dividends, the relative 
benefits are greater for the less wealthy. 
 35. Thomas Piketty advocates for a progressive annual tax on capital. PIKKETY, supra note 28, 
at 572. Tech billionaire, Bill Gates, has proposed taxing robots that replace human workers. I, 
Taxpayer, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2017, at 72. See generally James K. Boyce & Peter Barnes, How to 
Pay for Universal Basic Income, EVONOMICS (Nov. 28, 2016), http://evonomics.com/how-to-pay-for-
universal-basic-income/ [https://perma.cc/5KSK-MY7E]. 
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of whites was $23,000.36 Fully thirty-eight percent of African-Americans 
had no financial assets, compared to only fourteen percent of whites. 
Younger citizens also are underrepresented in equity markets. Where 
sixty-two percent of individuals ages fifty to sixty-four hold stocks, only 
thirty-one percent of individuals ages eighteen to twenty-nine do, and the 
percentage of eighteen to twenty-nine-year-olds who invest is declining.37 
Demographic differences in equity ownership raise several troubling 
issues beyond the overarching issue of socioeconomic inequality. Racial 
gaps in equity ownership can be attributed in large part to the persisting 
effects of past racialized policies (e.g., slavery, segregation, exclusionary 
laws) as well as present disadvantages (e.g., failing schools, housing and 
employment discrimination). Such inequality of opportunity raises 
important questions of justice and morality and creates realistic 
perceptions of relative disadvantage that contribute to racial tension and 
civil unrest. It also poses economic challenges: as the United States 
becomes more racially diverse, it becomes more important to ensure that 
all segments of our population have the resources needed to become 
productive citizens and consumers. Age-based differences also raise 
problems. For example, older shareholders are likely to prefer companies 
that pursue short-term goals rather than make long-term investments, and 
retirees may be less concerned about how companies treat employees than 
younger shareholders who are still in the workforce. Yet, to the extent 
individual shareholders participate in corporate governance, it is older, 
whiter (and of course wealthier)38 citizens who exercise the most influence 
over companies. 
                                                     
 36. REBECCA TIPPETT ET AL., CTR. FOR GLOBAL POLICY SOLUTIONS, BEYOND BROKE: WHY 
CLOSING THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP IS A PRIORITY FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY 2 (May 
2014), http://globalpolicysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/BeyondBroke_Exec_Summary. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/L27M-6Q7K]. In 2013, the percentage of non-Hispanic black or Hispanic 
households owning stocks was 36–37%, whereas the percentage of non-Hispanic white households 
owning stocks was 60%. GALLUP, supra note 2. The mean value of stock holdings for households with 
holdings was $99,200 for non-Hispanic black or Hispanic households, and $315,400 for white, non-
Hispanic households. GALLUP, supra note 2. 
 37. GALLUP, supra note 2. In 2013, the mean value of stock holdings for households whose head 
was less than thirty-five years old amounted to $42,700. For households whose head was between 
sixty-five and seventy-four, the mean amounted to $552,200. U.S. FED RESERVE, SURVEY OF 
CONSUMER FINANCES CHARTBOOK (2013) [hereinafter SCF]. While age-based differences in equity 
ownership can be traced in part to the investing life cycle (savings tend to accumulate overtime), to 
the extent older citizens participate more in corporate governance, they exercise greater influence over 
corporate behavior. 
 38. In 2013, only 11.4% of households in the bottom twenty percent for income held stocks, 
whereas ninety-three percent of households in the top decile for income held stocks. SFC, supra note 
37, at 510. Moreover, only 15.8% of households in the bottom twenty-five percent for net worth held 
stocks, whereas 91.6% of households in the top decile for net worth held stocks. Id. at 540. The mean 
value of stock holdings for households with holdings in the bottom twenty-five percent of net worth 
562 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:551 
While hardly a definitive solution, Blueprint would counteract these 
patterns by redistributing both investment returns from, and control over, 
the corporate sector. This would allow our corporations to better benefit 
all our citizens. The result would be more justice, less racial tension, and 
a brighter future. 
C. Increasing Poverty and Income Insecurity 
In addition to rising inequality and demographic differences in equity 
markets, the United States has also seen increasing poverty in recent years. 
In 2014, the U.S. poverty rate was four percent higher than it had been 
four decades earlier.39 This trend has likely been driven by many of the 
same factors that contribute to rising inequality.40 For example, some 
estimates predict that automation could eliminate almost half of all jobs in 
the near future.41 Such developments threaten not only more poverty but 
also greater income insecurity—insecurity worsened by the erosion of the 
social safety net provided by family and community ties and by social 
insurance programs like Medicare and Social Security.42 
It is worth noting that inequality and poverty have their own negative 
macroeconomic effects. For example, poverty and economic stress make 
it difficult for individuals to invest in their own human capital.43 And a 
robust literature shows that income inequality is harmful to economic 
growth.44 
Blueprint would help address these problems, albeit imperfectly. 
This is because it would give Shareholders a variable income subsidy 
determined by the dividends received by the Portfolio. Although it would 
not provide a guaranteed minimum level of income, this is an advantage 
                                                     
was $6,400, whereas the mean value of stock holdings for households with holdings in the top decile 
was $1,161,700. Id. at 542. 
 39. Anthony B. Atkinson, How to Spread the Wealth: Practical Policies for Reducing Inequality, 
95 FOREIGN AFF. 29, 29 (2016). 
 40. See supra text accompanying notes 23–35. 
 41. MCKINSEY & CO., A FUTURE THAT WORKS: AUTOMATION EMPLOYMENT AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 4 (2017); Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How 
Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 265 (2017). 
 42. See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing declines in community support and activity); Soc. Sec. & Medicare 
Bd. of Tr., A Summary of the 2017 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/ 
oact/trsum/ [https://perma.cc/N5P7-LG4J ] (“Both Social Security and Medicare face long-term 
financing shortfalls.”). 
 43. Acquiring education and skills takes time and money that are generally not available to those 
struggling for subsistence. 
 44. See Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, 109 Q. J. 
ECON. 465, 478–84 (1994); Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?, 
84 AM. ECON. REV. 600, 607–08 (1994).  
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to the extent we are concerned that a guaranteed income might create too 
great a disincentive to work and invest in one’s own human capital.45 
D. Need for More Innovation and Investment in the Future 
Unlike proprietorships and most partnerships, corporations are 
perpetual entities.46 Add in the corporate characteristics of asset lock-in, 
limited liability, delegated management, and transferable shares, and 
corporations become institutions particularly well-suited to making long-
term, large-scale, uncertain investments, such as investments in major 
infrastructure projects and in the invention and development of new and 
transformative products and services.47 Corporations were critical to the 
development of (to give just a few examples) the railroads, the electrical 
grid, and the internet. Today, they are developing cleaner energy sources, 
self-driving cars, and cures for cancer.48 
Such corporate innovations and investments provide a myriad of 
economic and social benefits, including not only financial returns for stock 
and bondholders but also employment opportunities, quality products, tax 
revenues for governments, and transformative technologies that contribute 
to human well-being. Moreover, those benefits contribute to the welfare 
of not only present but future generations. New York City’s residents still 
draw power from the electrical grid developed by the Edison Illuminating 
Company, the corporate precursor to today’s Consolidated Edison.49 
However, there is reason to fear that recent changes in shareholding 
and share voting patterns are degrading corporations’ ability and 
willingness to devote resources to developing such critical long-term 
projects.50 Tax incentives have created large institutional investors like 
pension and mutual funds; reduced trading costs have made it possible for 
them to seek profits from short-term trading; and the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) rules have given them power to influence 
                                                     
 45. See Eduardo Porter, A Universal Basic Income Is a Poor Tool to Fight Poverty, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/business/economy/universal-basic-income-
poverty.html (discussing disincentives to work). 
 46. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 766, 
(2012); Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, 
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 694–98 (2015). 
 47. Stout, supra note 46, at 687–89. 
 48. Id. at 699, 702–03. 
 49. The History of Alternating Current: The History of Electrification, EDISON TECH CTR., 
http://www.edisontechcenter.org/HistElectPowTrans.html [https://perma.cc/E5MA-ZYWV]. 
 50. Stout, supra note 46, at 708–21; see also supra note 5. 
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corporate behavior.51 The result—many influential academics, business 
leaders, and policy research institutes have argued—is a large and 
powerful shareholder class with perverse incentives to pressure managers 
to pursue short-term financial results while neglecting long-term 
investments.52 For example, in the 1950s, American corporations retained 
sixty percent of their profits for research and development (R&D); today 
they retain less than ten percent.53 Rather than reinvesting, American 
corporations buy back their own stock and reduce “expenses” like payroll 
and R&D to artificially boost earnings per share.54 The great American 
corporate research labs of the mid- to late-20th century are disappearing 
as employees are cut and the focus is shifted from pure research to modest 
projects with immediate profit potential.55 
Blueprint would help address this problem by creating a new, 
powerful, and inherently long-term institutional investor, the Fund. The 
Administrators cannot trade, and the Shareholders cannot sell or 
hypothecate their shares. Neither have reason to focus on the share prices 
of the companies in the Portfolio.56 Indeed, to the extent Blueprint gives 
Shareholders a bigger role in corporate governance (which they will 
typically exercise by selecting a proxy service whose voting guidelines 
                                                     
 51. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1907, 1922–23 (2013). See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder 
Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003 (2013). 
 52. See, e.g., supra note 51. The perverse incentives arise from the fact that while most 
individuals want to make long-term, diversified investments not only in different equities but also in 
bonds, real estate, and their own human capital, the portfolio managers who make trading decisions 
for mutual, pension, and hedge funds are judged only on their short-term performance and are 
relatively undiversified. See STOUT, supra note 4, at 50–51 (describing investor “Tragedy of the 
Commons”), 63–94 (describing why fund managers are poor representatives of individual investors’ 
interests). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic 
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014). 
 53. David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation, 
107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 148–49 (2013) (citing Jack B. Jacobs, ‘Patient Capital’: Can Delaware 
Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 4 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1645–64 (2011)); see also Robert J. 
Gordon, Policy Insight No. 63: Is U.S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the 
Six Headwinds, CTR. ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH (Sept. 2012), http://cepr.org/sites/default/ 
files/policy_insights/PolicyInsight63.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AZC-QDTC]. 
 54. William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014,  https://hbr.org/ 
2014/09/profits-without-prosperity [https://perma.cc/WC6Y-CZQG]. 
 55. Chris Matthews, The Death of American Research and Development, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/21/death-american-research-and-development/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Q5T6-UXGZ].  
 56. There remains the problem of executive compensation schemes that give company 
executives such a focus. See supra text accompanying note 6; see also MICHAEL B. DORFF, 
INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT 
123–49 (2014). If Blueprint succeeded in giving Shareholders, who are intrinsically long-term, a 
greater role in corporate governance, they might be able to reform such executive compensation 
schemes. 
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suit their preferences), they counterbalance the power of short-term 
investors. And, while a minority of older Shareholders nearing the end of 
their lifespans may favor corporate policies that promote too-high 
dividends or short-term results,57 most Shareholders are younger and have 
decades of investment returns ahead of them. They have incentive to favor 
efficient reinvestment for the future over immediate payouts.58 The result 
is the creation and empowerment of a class of Shareholders that has, on 
average, a much longer investment time horizon than the institutions that 
currently exercise the loudest voice in corporate governance. 
Finally, it is also possible that Blueprint can encourage more 
innovation, entrepreneurship, and creativity among individual 
Shareholders themselves. This is because it can reduce individuals’ 
immediate economic insecurity, giving them “breathing room” and 
resources to take business risks and invest in their own human capital.59 
E. Externalization of Costs and Benefits of Corporate Activity 
Due to their great size, limited liability, and the inevitable 
imperfections of tort law and government regulation, business 
corporations have immense capacity to make third parties bear some of the 
costs of their activity while retaining all the profits. (Joel Bakan has 
famously described corporations as “externalizing machines.”)60 
Examples of such external costs from corporate activity are legion, 
including environmental pollution, defective goods, employee deaths and 
injuries, high-risk/high-yield activities that put the financial system at risk, 
and pumping carbon into the atmosphere with resulting climate change. 
Although less-well recognized (albeit arguably as or more 
important), social benefits are another external effect of corporate activity. 
In the process of generating investment returns for shareholders, 
corporations also produce jobs for employees, products for consumers, tax 
revenues for governments, a skilled, socialized workforce for other 
                                                     
 57. On the other hand, there is evidence that people tend to become more altruistic and prosocial 
as they age, suggesting that older shareholders may altruistically remain interested in promoting long-
term corporate investments that benefit younger generations. See generally Janelle N. Beadle et al., 
Aging, Empathy, and Prosociality, 70 J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 213 
(2015). 
 58. Although Shareholders may be somewhat myopic, it is unrealistic to believe they would be 
more focused on the short term than fund managers whose professional success often depends on the 
next quarter’s portfolio returns. 
 59. Scott Santens, Universal Basic Income Accelerates Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of 
Failure, EVONOMICS (Feb. 12, 2017), http://evonomics.com/universal-basic-income-accelerates-
innovation-reducing-fear-failure/ [https://perma.cc/8WKE-8EF8].  
 60. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 70 
(2005) (titling chapter “The Externalizing Machine”). 
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employers, and critical new infrastructure and technologies for the broader 
society. As noted in the previous section, these social goods enormously 
benefit not only present but also future generations—just as some 
corporate external costs, like contributing to climate change and 
environmental degradation, harm future generations. 
Unfortunately, when corporations are managed to maximize only 
profits or “shareholder value,” they ignore both external costs imposed and 
external benefits foregone by their activity. And today’s public business 
corporations face considerable pressure to maximize profits and/or 
shareholder value, much of it generated by institutional shareholders like 
pension, mutual, and hedge funds.61 The resulting “psychopathic” 
corporate behavior (as Bakan puts it)62 emphasizes short-term financial 
results while ignoring ethics and the welfare of stakeholders and future 
generations. This approach fails to serve most shareholders, because they 
are not only shareholders; they are also consumers, employees, taxpayers, 
organisms that must live in the environment, and ethical beings who often 
care (to at least some degree) about others’ welfare, including the welfare 
of those who come after them.63 From the Shareholders’ perspective, 
“external” corporate costs and benefits are not really external at all. 
Blueprint addresses the corporate externalities problem by giving 
Shareholders a greater role in corporate governance. The Shareholders 
would be able to aggregate their voting power through new Shareholder-
oriented proxy services similar to those that already exist to serve short-
term institutional investors. As a result, Shareholders could collectively 
and effectively use their voting power to shift corporations toward better 
serving society and Shareholders themselves, countering the short-term 
shareholder pressures that currently drive corporate managers to maximize 
profits at the expense of public health, public safety, and the planet. 
  F. Corporate Money in Politics 
In addition to a general concern about the corporate externalities 
problem, in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United, there has been increasing debate on the role of corporate money in 
politics.64 To simplify the problem, corporations can allocate resources to 
socially beneficial activities like producing quality goods and services, 
                                                     
 61. See supra notes 4–5. Additional pressure comes from “pay for performance” executive 
compensation schemes that emphasize share price or profits. See generally Stout, supra note 6. 
62. BAKAN, supra note 60, at 60. 
 63. It does, however, serve fund managers, private equity partners, and CEOs whose pay is 
driven by stock price performance, as they are much less diversified than shareholders and their greater 
wealth also allows them to escape many of the external costs from corporate activity. 
 64. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010). 
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generating employment opportunities, or even paying taxes. They can 
also, however, devote resources to capturing the political system for what 
economists call “rent-seeking.”65 One example would be devoting 
resources to evading socially beneficial regulation or taxation. Between 
1998 and 2008, for example, bank interests spent $3.4 billion lobbying the 
U.S. government to deregulate derivatives,66 increasing systemic risk and 
contributing to the 2008 financial crisis. 
Business corporations can influence the political system through 
campaign donations, lobbying, “revolving door” hiring, and public 
relations. Individuals can do the same, of course, but corporations’ great 
wealth and concentration allows them to exercise outsize influence. This 
may not be a problem when corporations promote rules that serve the 
broader society. Corporate political influence becomes problematic, 
however, when it is used for rent-seeking. Further, rent-seeking is more 
likely when corporate political activity is opaque since customers, 
employees, investors, and citizens cannot detect or respond to it. 
Through Blueprint, Shareholders would be empowered to 
collectively address the issue of corporate money in politics. They could 
do this by delegating their votes in corporate elections to proxy advisory 
services whose guidelines support greater disclosure of corporate political 
activities. Better corporate disclosure surrounding political activity would 
allow citizens and Shareholders alike to better police against corporate 
rent-seeking, and ensure that corporate political activity is directed to more 
socially beneficial ends.67 
G. “Softer” Social Ills 
In addition to the relatively quantifiable problems described above, 
Blueprint can help address other, “softer” social ills that have attracted 
recent attention. One such ill is declining public support for capitalism in 
general and for the corporate sector in particular. 
                                                     
 65. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 476–91 (1992) (discussing rent-seeking); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and 
the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 228–30 (2012). On the misuse of resources for rent-seeking 
instead of for productive activity, see generally William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productive, 
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INTERNATIONALIST, Jan. 1, 2011; WALL ST. WATCH, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15, 
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 67. Indeed, corporations may have more incentive to promote transparency than politicians do. 
Fred McChesney has argued persuasively that politicians often solicit campaign contributions from 
corporations by threatening regulatory action in what amounts to a form of extortion. See generally 
FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL 
EXTORTION (1997). 
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Surveys show that public trust in business has declined significantly. 
From 1977 until 1990, twenty to thirty-two percent of survey respondents 
reported having “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of confidence in big 
business, while between 2008 and 2017 these figures declined to only 
sixteen to twenty-two percent.68 Younger generations in particular may be 
losing faith in capitalism; recent polls show more young Americans 
disapproving of capitalism than supporting it.69 Some might applaud such 
shifts in public attitude. But to the extent a thriving business sector and 
strong corporations contribute to social welfare, reduced support for 
business translates to lost progress and prosperity. Blueprint can help build 
public support for capitalism and the corporate sector by allowing the vast 
majority of the population to benefit from, have a stake in, and influence 
business corporations. It would also increase perceptions that corporations 
operate in an ethical and socially beneficial fashion. 
Another potential problem that could be tempered by Blueprint is the 
widespread loss of a sense of personal agency and purpose that could result 
if automation continues to eliminate greater and greater numbers of jobs.70 
Many Shareholders might choose not to direct the Administrators on how 
to vote their proportionate share of the equities in the Portfolio. However, 
many others would likely elect to use a proxy service to vote their shares, 
and a few might seek to become directly involved in creating voting 
guidelines. This citizen involvement in corporate governance can, at least 
to some extent, substitute for the sense of agency and purpose provided by 
employment. Further, it can promote greater social cohesion and civic 
engagement by promoting a sense of “in-group” membership among 
                                                     
 68. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP NEWS, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx. 
 69. A 2016 Harvard poll of young adults (eighteen to twenty-nine years old) nationwide found 
that fifty-one percent do not support capitalism while only forty-two percent support it. A few years 
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 70. See The Dalai Lama & Arthur C. Brooks, Dalai Lama: Behind Our Anxiety, the Fear of 
Being Unneeded, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/opinion/dalai-
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Shareholders.71 This collective sense of community, especially when 
combined with increased equality, economic security, and public support 
for capitalism, pays additional dividends by reducing the likelihood of 
destructive civic unrest.72 
Finally, Blueprint promotes intergenerational equity and progress. 
The present-day corporate emphasis on maximizing “shareholder value” 
tends to focus corporate managers on immediate financial results, whether 
measured by accounting profits or by share price. This can cause 
corporations to pass up investment opportunities that would generate 
primarily long-term returns, for example, by declining to pursue the kind 
of fundamental research that leads to transformative innovations that 
benefit future generations.73 Similarly, a focus on immediate financial 
returns tempts corporate managers to ignore social costs likely to be 
incurred primarily in the future, such as the costs of climate change. By 
creating a class of empowered long-term Shareholders, Blueprint would 
help corporations invest in the kind of innovation that benefits future 
generations. It would also allow prosocial Shareholders to better express 
their preferences for controlling generation-spanning external costs like 
pollution and climate change. 
III. CHALLENGES AND CRITIQUES 
Space constraints preclude our addressing every possible objection 
or obstacle to implementing Blueprint here. Instead, we discuss the most 
obvious issues: adequacy and sources of funding; agency costs imposed 
by Fund Administrators; reduced informational efficiency in stock pricing; 
practical obstacles to Shareholder voting; and the risk of irrational or 
antisocial Shareholder preferences. 
A. Adequacy and Sources of Funding 
As an initial matter, the size of the Portfolio determines the degree to 
which Blueprint promotes democratic capitalism but does not change the 
                                                     
 71. See LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 145–
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 72. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Income Distribution, Political Instability, and 
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 73. See generally Stout, supra note 46. 
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direction of its effects. The only question is whether the Blueprint would 
have more, or less, impact. 
For the past five years, U.S. corporate profits have averaged about 
$1.6 trillion annually.74 There are an estimated 227 million U.S. citizens 
over the age of eighteen.75 This means corporate profits per adult citizen 
average over $7,000 annually. The impact of Blueprint, in terms of the 
significance of the income to and influence exercised by Shareholders, 
depends on how large a percentage of outstanding corporate securities are 
held by the Fund. For example, if the Fund held ten percent of all equities, 
each Shareholder’s representative interest in corporate profits would 
amount to about $700 annually. The larger the share of equities held by 
the Fund, the greater Blueprint’s impact. 
There are several ways the Fund could amass a significant Portfolio 
relatively quickly. First, ultra-high-net worth individuals are a significant 
potential source of portfolio donations. The upper decile of wealth-holders 
own more than eighty percent of all stocks,76 and eventually their fortunes 
must change hands; it has been estimated that $60 trillion will be 
transferred from U.S. estates between 2007 and 2061.77 This cohort 
already frequently participates in philanthropy. For example, David 
Callahan reports that charitable giving from people making over $500,000 
annually increased fifty-seven percent from 2003 to 2013; Callahan argues 
that for the ultra-wealthy with “vast fortunes . . . philanthropy is the only 
real place the money can go.”78 If the top decile of equity holders 
contribute half their holdings to the Portfolio, while living or upon death, 
the Fund would within a few decades come to hold forty percent of all 
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corporate equities. This proportion would continue to grow as long as the 
ultra-wealthy choose to contribute. 
Second, corporations also have reason to donate their own shares. 
Contributing to the Fund can appeal to consumers, employees, and 
investors (consider the success of Google’s “Don’t Be Evil” strategy 
during its IPO or current interest in so-called “benefit corporations”).79 In 
addition, because the Fund is a long-term shareholder, donating stock to 
the Fund will appeal to some public companies as a means of 
counterbalancing the influence of short-term shareholders, especially 
activist hedge funds.80 
Finally, although our proposal assumes the Fund would acquire its 
Portfolio through donations, the Fund’s effectiveness could be accelerated 
through government support. At a minimum, treating donations to the 
Fund like other tax-deductible charitable contributions promotes donor 
interest. More ambitiously, government revenues raised from taxes or 
other sources could be used to buy shares to place in the Fund. This 
requires legislative action, but such a policy might enjoy widespread 
public support given Blueprint’s broad benefits. 
B. Agency Costs Imposed by Fund Administrators 
Because the value of the Portfolio might measure in the trillions of 
dollars, it is important to protect against the possibility that Administrators 
might impose agency costs on Shareholders by shirking or stealing.81 Our 
plan includes several such protective elements. 
Perhaps the primary source of Shareholder protection is the very 
limited discretion granted to Administrators under Blueprint. Unlike 
managers of a typical mutual fund, Administrators would not be allowed 
to trade securities or determine how securities in the Portfolio are voted. 
There is relatively little damage they can do to Shareholders’ interests. 
Their job is indeed purely administrative (maintaining lists of 
Shareholders and securities in the Portfolio, ensuring dividends are 
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“passed through” equally to all Shareholders, and ensuring equities in the 
Portfolio are voted according to Shareholders’ directions). Modern 
information technologies have made these administrative tasks far less 
costly.82 
Additional protection against agency costs could be built into the 
Administrators’ compensation. For example, Administrators could be paid 
a predetermined fee that would not change based on the value or 
performance of the Portfolio, thus reducing the possibility of perverse 
incentives. 
Finally, various processes could be adopted to maximize the chances 
that the individuals selected to become Administrators are ethical and 
representative of Shareholders’ interests. For example, Administrators 
could be periodically elected by Shareholders; drawn at random from the 
citizenry as jurors are chosen; subject to term limits; selected to represent 
certain demographics; and so forth. 
C. Reduced Informational Efficiency in Stock Pricing 
Because the Fund would not trade the stocks in its Portfolio, the 
larger the percentage of a company’s shares held by the Fund, the less 
trading there is likely to be in that company’s shares. This may reduce the 
“informational efficiency” of the market price of the company’s shares.83 
A similar concern has been raised with regard to index funds, which also 
trade rarely.84 
However, so long as any significant portion of a company’s shares 
are owned and traded by individual or institutional shareholders outside 
the Fund, market prices are likely to remain at least somewhat 
informationally efficient. Moreover, it can be argued that the benefits 
associated with marginal increases in informational efficiency are small.85 
Finally, it is not clear that companies need publicly-reported stock prices 
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at all to function effectively, as demonstrated by the long-term success of 
many private companies. 
D. Logistics of Shareholder Voting 
Voting the shares of companies to improve corporate performance is 
a classic common good; one shareholder incurs all the costs of becoming 
informed and casting their votes, and all shareholders enjoy the resulting 
benefits. Thus, it can be expected that many shareholders will be 
disinclined to become informed and vote. Like most present-day 
individual shareholders, Shareholders will be “rationally apathetic.”86 
This can be ameliorated by requiring the Administrators to dedicate 
some percentage of the income received by the Fund to pay proxy advisory 
firms selected by the Shareholders. Like today’s proxy advisory services, 
these services would develop voting guidelines that direct the 
Administrators on how to vote the portion of the shares in the portfolio 
attributable to the Shareholders who selected that service. Because the 
Fund will pay fees in proportion to the number of Shareholders who select 
a particular proxy service, incentives are created to develop new services 
that cater to Shareholders on the basis of the quality of their voting 
guidelines, rather than low cost. Such new proxy advisory services would 
take better account of Shareholders’ stronger preferences for long-term 
financial performance and for better corporate social, environmental, and 
ethical performance. 
Using new information technologies, individual Shareholders could 
also be given the option to directly inform Administrators how to vote their 
portion of the shares held in the Portfolio. But, unless Shareholders are 
compensated for doing so, rational apathy is likely to deter them. This may 
be desirable; share voting guidelines developed by competing proxy 
services would likely be more informed and efficient than voting decisions 
made by relatively uninformed individual Shareholders. Although 
Shareholders would still need to inform themselves about the quality and 
nature of competing proxy services, this is a much less burdensome task 
than becoming informed about the performance of all the companies 
whose shares are held in the Portfolio. Shareholders could further be 
encouraged to select a proxy service by making a Shareholder’s receipt of 
payments from the Fund contingent on doing so. 
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  E. The Risk of Irrational or Antisocial Shareholder Preferences 
Some readers might fear that Shareholders, if given a greater role in 
corporate governance, might make even worse decisions than today’s 
institutional shareholders and proxy advisory services. In particular, 
Shareholders might prove even more short-sighted, or even more willing 
to impose external costs and withhold external benefits in the pursuit of 
personal financial gain. 
This paternalistic critique implicitly assumes significantly superior 
foresight on the part of institutional investors who are presumed to 
participate in corporate governance in a fashion that serves their 
beneficiaries’ best interests. This outcome is highly unlikely given the 
perverse incentives institutional investors face.87 Given the very short 
stock holding periods typical of today’s institutional investors, and the 
much longer time frame of Shareholders, it is extremely unlikely that 
empowering Shareholders could make the problem of short-termism 
worse. 
There is also reason to believe that Shareholders would be much 
more interested in the problems of constraining corporate external costs 
and maximizing corporate social benefits than the institutional fund 
managers that dominate corporate governance today are. This is because, 
compared to fund managers, Shareholders are more vulnerable to 
corporate external costs like job losses or environmental pollution, and are 
more dependent on corporate external benefits like skills training or 
quality products. Similarly, they may be more interested in promoting 
corporate political transparency than the ultra-wealthy, who are more 
likely to benefit from corporate rent-seeking. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have provided a thumbnail sketch of a proposal to 
address many currently pressing social and economic problems and, in the 
process, restore public faith in the idea of a democratic capitalism that 
serves the vast majority of people. We have shown how implementing 
Blueprint would provide a number of significant benefits and is unlikely 
to present any dangers. Practical challenges exist, but they can be 
overcome. The only real question is the degree to which Blueprint is 
implemented and its potential benefits become a reality. 
Our proposal, however, faces another obstacle: certain widely held, 
often unconscious, and fundamentally erroneous beliefs about how the 
world works. We mention some of these psychological hurdles below in 
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the hope that drawing attention to them and to their inaccuracy can temper 
their effect. 
The first erroneous belief is the often-automatic assumption that all 
policy problems must be solved either through market forces or by 
government intervention. This assumption overlooks the demonstrated 
reality that private ordering often provides a third way, superior to either 
free markets or regulation, for addressing certain economic and social 
problems. History has shown that private organizations are capable of 
amassing enormous assets and exercising great influence.88 Consider, for 
example, the Red Cross, the Sierra Club, private universities, and the 
Catholic Church. Modern business corporations—some of which rival 
nation-states in their power and influence—are yet another example of the 
power of private ordering. Corporations emerged as private ordering 
solutions to the problem of aggregating resources to pursue long-term, 
large-scale, and uncertain projects requiring specific investments.89 By 
proposing Blueprint, we simply take the concept of private ordering as a 
policy solution to the next level. 
A second psychological hurdle to implementing Blueprint is the 
common, but empirically incorrect, assumption that human beings are 
purely selfish actors concerned only with amassing financial wealth. This 
often-unconscious assumption, which is a staple of more-superficial 
economic analysis, has been definitively proven false by innumerable 
research studies in cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, 
developmental psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, evolutionary 
science, social psychology, and biology.90 It also flies in the face of 
centuries of human altruism and devotion to nonprofit endeavors, not to 
mention present-day individual and corporate philanthropy. Given this 
reality, it is not implausible that Blueprint could be organized and funded 
in reliance upon some degree of human altruism. 
Finally, there is a natural human tendency to assume that any policy 
solution or arrangement we have not seen at work before must suffer from 
some fundamental flaw and cannot work in the future. In the past, this 
tendency has motivated resistance to many important social changes we 
now recognize to be beneficial. Examples include the adoption of 
representative democracy, the abolition of human slavery, free public 
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education, and the granting of full legal rights to women. As these 
examples illustrate, we would do well to believe we can do better in the 
future than we have done in the past. This Blueprint for Citizen Capitalism 
provides a hopeful path to such a better future. 
